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Abstract
This paper studies sabotage in tournaments with at least three contestants, where the
contestants know each other well. Every contestant has an incentive to direct sabotage
specically against his most dangerous rival. In equilibrium, contestants who choose a
higher productive e¤ort are sabotaged more heavily. This might explain ndings from
psychology, where victims of mobbing are sometimes found to be overachieving. Further,
sabotage equalizes promotion chances. The e¤ect is most pronounced if the production
function is linear in sabotage, and the cost function depends only on the sum of all sabo-
tage activities: in an interior equilibrium, who will win is a matter of chance, even when
contestants di¤er a great deal in their abilities. This, in turn, has adverse consequences
for who might want to participate in a tournament. Since better contestants anticipate
that they will be sabotaged more strongly, it may happen that the most able stay out
and the tournament selects one of the less able with probability one. I also study the case
where some contestants are easy victims, i. e. easier to sabotage than others.
JEL-Codes: M51, J41, J29
Keywords: tournament, contest, sabotage, selection
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1 Introduction
Labor market tournaments have the double role of selecting the most able individuals
and supplying incentives. Although many economists have voiced the opinion that the
selection aspect is at least as important as the incentives aspect (e.g. Rosen 1986, Schlicht
1988, Glazer and Hassin 1988, Prendergast 1999), the focus of the bulk of research has
clearly been on the latter. This paper explicitly addresses the selection aspect. The
question is whether tournaments, and, more generally, relative comparison contests, tend
to select the most able individuals.
In most tournament models, more able contestants have a greater chance of winning.1
But the picture changes radically once we take into account that tournaments - like
other relative comparison contests - give each contestant an incentive to sabotage his
rivals (Lazear 1989, Konrad 2000, Chen 2003). Here sabotage is a catchall term for
di¤erent kinds of activities that are intended to hinder the productive e¤orts of other
contestants. These range from strategic withholding of information, less mutual help, to
outright forms of mobbing and actual physical sabotage. There is one obvious problem
in using a tournament for selection in the presence of sabotage. The result might be the
promotion of the best saboteur - a contestant who might be not very good at working
productively - and promoting the best saboteur is not necessarily in the interest of the
rm. This is a particularly striking example of the more general point that ability is a
multidimensional property, and that the abilities and personality traits needed to win a
tournament are not always the same as those needed at a higher level in a hierarchy.
This paper focusses on a more subtle point. It starts with two observations. In
many real world tournaments, there are more than two contestants who compete for a
single prize; thus I will assume throughout that the number of contestants is at least
three. And the contestants often know each other well, especially if they work closely and
regularly together. In such a case each contestant knows who his most dangerous rival
1Lazear and Rosen (1981), Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983), Green and Stokey (1983), Rosen (1986).
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is. Intuitively, sabotaging a strong rival improves ones own chance of winning more than
sabotaging a weaker rival does. Therefore, each contestant has an incentive to sabotage
the most dangerous rival most strongly. The paper shows that this has an equalizing
e¤ect on the winning probabilities. The e¤ect is most pronounced when the production
functions are linear in sabotage, and the cost functions of the contestants depends only
on the sum of the sabotage activities: in an interior equilibrium, each contestant has the
same chance of winning. In other words, who will win the tournament is a matter of pure
chance, even if some contestants are much more able than other contestants.
In fact, the selection properties of tournaments may be even much worse. Since the
most able individuals are sabotaged most, they may well have a lower expected utility from
participation in the tournament. Once we take into account the fact that participation in
a tournament is endogenous, it turns out that only the least able individuals may want to
participate. In that case, a tournament selects one of the least able with probability one.
These results are derived in a model in which all contestants are similar in their ability
to cope with sabotage. However, due to di¤erent abilities, or di¤erent positions within the
rm, some contestants may be easier to sabotage than others. Thus I also consider the
case where some contestants are easy victims. Easy victims are sabotaged more strongly
and have lower chances of winning the tournament.
The incentives to sabotage were pointed out early in the tournament literature (Nale-
bu¤ and Stiglitz 1983, p. 40). The present paper is most closely related to Lazear (1989)
and Chen (2003). Lazear (1989) considers the optimal tournament reward structure from
the incentives aspect and shows that, in the presence of sabotage, the optimal prize struc-
ture is compressed. However, Lazear does not discuss the possibility of directing sabotage
specically against stronger rivals and the implications of this for the selection proper-
ties. Chen (2003) studies the implication of sabotage in selection tournaments. He points
out the fact that some contestants may have a comparative advantage in sabotaging,
and shows that stronger contestants do not necessarily have better chances of winning
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in equilibrium. In contrast to Chen (2003), I assume that the output produced by a
contestant is additively separable in the sabotage activities of his rivals. This drives the
equalizing e¤ect of sabotage, which is not found in Chen (2003). Other papers that study
sabotage include Drago and Turnbull (1991) (who study how bargaining between workers
about e¤ort and mutual help a¤ects optimal incentive schemes), Chan (1996) (who stud-
ies external recruitment as a means of keeping sabotage incentives low), Kräkel (2000)
(who considers the e¤ect of relative deprivation in tournaments with sabotage), and Chen
(2005) (who studies incentive e¤ects of external recruitment).
My paper contributes to this literature in the following ways. First, I show that
if production is additively separable, sabotage has an equalizing e¤ect on the winning
probabilities. In the classic benchmark where the production functions are linear and the
cost function depends only on the sum of all sabotage activities, in an interior equilibrium,
all contestants have equal chances of winning. Second, I show that only the weaker
contestants my want to participate. A third contribution is the result that easy victims
are sabotaged more heavily and thus have lower chances of winning in equilibrium. A
fourth contribution of my paper is that it studies conditions under which interior equilibria
exist. Due to the complexity of the problem, interior equilibria are assumed in most of the
literature. In an example with a specic cost function, I derive necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for existence of interior equilibria. It turns out to be crucial that the contestants
do not di¤er extremely in their abilities. Hence, an analysis based on rst order conditions
for an interior equilibrium may be misleading. However, the e¤ect that sabotage tends to
make promotion chances more equal is robust even for equilibria with corner solutions.
There is considerable evidence for the importance of sabotage, both from eld data
(Drago and Garvey 1998)2 and from experiments (Harbring and Irlenbusch 2004). Har-
bring et al. (2004) is an interesting experimental study of sabotage in an asymmetric
contest. It gives support to the idea that more able contestants will be sabotaged more
2There are also papers that use data from sports: Becker and Huselid (1992) (auto racing) and
Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2000) (European soccer).
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heavily. However, the model and experimental setup in Harbring et al. (2004) di¤er from
the model used here.3
The present paper also sheds new light on ndings from psychology, where in some
studies, victims of bullying in the workplace are found to be overachieving: more
achievement oriented, punctual, accurate and conscientious than the control group (Zapf
and Einarsen 2003, p. 178). While this is often explained with regard to group norms,
the present paper o¤ers another explanation. As I show below, people that choose higher
productive e¤ort are sabotaged more strongly. The reason is that they are more danger-
ous rivals in a contest for promotion. Another nding is that victims of bullying tend to
be more vulnerable than the control groups, e.g. low in social competencies, bad conict
managers, unassertive and weak personalities (Zapf and Einarsen 2003, p. 174¤). I
capture this in a stylized way by considering easy victims.
Sabotage-like activities have been studied in other contexts as well. Shubiks (1954)
model of a truel (three person duel) is closely related to the present paper. Here the
truelistwith the lowest shooting ability may have the best chances of survival. The
reason is that the contestants have an incentive to shoot at the truelist who is the best
shot. Baumol (1992) considers sabotage in the process of innovation. Skaperdas and
Grofman (1995) and Harrington and Hess (1996) model negative campaigning in election
races. Konrad (2000) studies sabotage in rent seeking contests. Auriol et al. (2002) show
that, when the principal cannot commit to long term contracts, career concerns in teams
give the agents incentives to sabotage, even if they are not involved in a tournament
scheme. The results of the present paper are also relevant to these other contests.
In addition, the paper also contributes to the small but growing literature on the
selection properties of tournaments and other kinds of contests. One important paper in
3Harbring et al. (2004) consider a two stage game: on the rst stage, sabotage is chosen, on the
second stage productive e¤ort; sabotage increases the victims marginal cost of working productively; and
sabotage of player i against an opponent j can take only two values. In contrast, in the present paper a
one shot simultaneous move game is studied: sabotage and productive e¤ort are chosen simultaneously;
sabotage destroys part of the output produced by the victim; and sabotage of i against j can take any
nonnegative real number.
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this literature is Rosen (1986), who studied a sequential elimination tournament. Meyer
(1991) works out how to design a repeated contest between the same contestants in order
to get the most information about the contestants. Clark and Riis (2001) study a selection
tournament in the case where performance is deterministic. They show that, by making
the winner prize depend on which of two test standards are passed, the tournament
can be designed to select the most able contestant as a winner. Hvide and Kristiansen
(2003) consider risk taking in a selection contest. However, none of these papers considers
sabotage.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 shows that
sabotage tends to equalize promotion chances. Section 4 considers the decision whether
to participate in a tournament. Section 5 studies easy victims. Section 6 gives necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for existence of an interior equilibrium, albeit for a somewhat
simplied example. Section 7 concludes. The appendix collects some of the longer proofs.
2 The model
There are n  3 contestants. For simplicity, the contestants are assumed to be risk neutral.
Contestant i chooses productive e¤ort xi and sabotage e¤orts si1; :::; si(i 1); si(i+1); :::; sin,
where sij denotes the sabotage of contestant i against contestant j: He has a personal
cost of doing so which is given by
ci
 
xi; si1; :::; si(i 1); si(i+1); :::; sin

; (1)
where ci : Rn ! R is increasing in all its arguments and convex. Contestants di¤er in their
abilities, hence each contestant may have a di¤erent cost function. I will assume that the
cost function is symmetric in the sabotage activities: exchanging sij and sik; while holding
constant all other decision variables of i; does not change the costs of i. The cost functions
are common knowledge among the contestants. This simplifying assumption captures the
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idea that work colleagues often know each other pretty well, while their superiors know
considerably less about them.
The output produced by contestant i is denoted by qi and assumed to be additively
separable:
qi =  (xi) 
X
j 6=i
 (sji) + "i: (2)
Here,  and  are strictly increasing and weakly concave functions:  is a production
function, and similarly,  is a destruction functionwhich describes how easy or di¢ cult
it is to destroy output of a rival.4 Equation (2) assumes that there are no cross e¤ects
between the sabotage activities. This is di¤erent from Chen (2003), where the marginal
impact of sabotage against i depends on how much sabotage is inicted on i by all
his rivals.5 Furthermore, (2) also presupposes that there are no cross e¤ects between
xi and the sabotage directed against i: Finally, "i is an error term. The error terms
"1; :::; "n are identically and independently distributed with PDF f: Let F denote the
CDF corresponding to f . I assume that F has full support and is strictly log-concave.6
The contestant with the highest output gets a winner prize w; which represents the
monetary equivalent of a promotion. All the other contestants get a strictly lower loser
prize which is normalized to zero. Let pi denote contestant is probability of winning.
Then his payo¤ is
ui = piw   ci
 
xi; si1; :::; si(i 1); si(i+1); :::; sin

:
4One could also assume that these functions di¤er across contestants, such that qi = i (xi)  P
j 6=i  j (sji) + "i. This would not change Proposition 1 qualitatively.
5In the notation of the present paper, Chen (2003) assumes that qi = aixi  
P
j bjsji

+ "i; where
 is an increasing and strictly concave function, ai is the productive ability of i; and bj the ability of
j to sabotage. An additional but minor di¤erence between the present paper and Chen (2003) is that
Chen (2003) assumes identical cost functions for all players and models di¤erent abilities with di¤erent
production functions. Finally, Chen (2003) assumes a cost function which depends only on the sum of
all the sabotage activities plus productive e¤ort.
6The assumption of log-concavity is fullled by most commonly studied distribution functions, see
Bagnoli and Bergstrom (1989).
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Contestant i maximizes ui subject to the non-negativity constraints xi  0 and sij  0
for all j 6= i.
3 Sabotage equalizes promotion chances
Let
yil :=  (xi) 
X
k 6=i
 (ski) 
 
 (xl) 
X
k 6=l
 (skl)
!
:
Note that yil = E (qi)  E (ql) : Using this notation, we have
pi =
Z 1
 1
[l 6=iF (yil + "i)] f ("i) d"i: (3)
The results of the paper are built on the following lemma.
Lemma 1 For all values of the decision variables,
pj > pk , 1
 0 (sij)
@pi
@sij
>
1
 0 (sik)
@pi
@sik
:
Proof. Di¤erentiating equation (3), we get
@pi
@sij
=  0 (sij)
Z 1
 1
f (yij + "i) [l 6=i;jF (yil + "i)] f ("i) d"i;
@pi
@sik
=  0 (sik)
Z 1
 1
f (yik + "i) [l 6=i;kF (yil + "i)] f ("i) d"i:
Hence,
1
 0 (sij)
@pi
@sij
  1
 0 (sik)
@pi
@sik
=
Z 1
 1
[f (yij + "i)F (yik + "i)  f (yik + "i)F (yij + "i)]
 [l 6=i;j;kF (yil + "i)] f ("i) d"i: (4)
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Suppose pj > pk: This is equivalent to E (qj) > E (qk) and to yij < yik: Since F (z) is
strictly log-concave, f (z) =F (z) decreases strictly in z. It follows that
f (yij + "i)
F (yij + "i)
>
f (yik + "i)
F (yik + "i)
;
or
f (yij + "i)F (yik + "i) > f (yik + "i)F (yij + "i) (5)
for all "i: Therefore the integrand in equation (4) is strictly positive.
This proves that
pj > pk ) 1
 0 (sij)
@pi
@sij
>
1
 0 (sik)
@pi
@sik
:
The converse statement can be proven similarly.
To understand Lemma 1, note that, in order to destroy one (marginal) unit of j
s output, i has to increase sij by 1= 
0 (sij) : Thus, 1 0(sij)
@pi
@sij
measures how much i s
chances to win increase if i destroys one unit of j s output. If pj > pk; Lemma 1 says
that destroying one unit of the output of j increases the chances of i more than destroying
one unit of the output of k does.
The basic insight behind the crucial line (5) in the proof is as follows. For a given "i;
the probability that i has a higher output than j is F (yij + "i) : Destroying one unit of the
output of j increases i s chance to win against j by f (yij + "i) : However, winning against
j is benecial for i only if i simultaneously wins against all other contestants, including
k: The probability to win against k is F (yik + "i) : Thus, for a given "i, the marginal
benet of destroying one unit of the output of j is proportional to f (yij + "i)F (yik + "i).
Similarly, the marginal benet of destroying one unit of the output of k is proportional
to f (yik + "i)F (yij + "i) : These two terms di¤er for two reasons. First, since pj > pk;
E (qj) > E (qk) and yij < yik; hence i is more likely to win against k than against j :
F (yik + "i) is greater than F (yij + "i). Second, f (yij + "i) may di¤er from f (yik + "i) :
If the density is decreasing, f (yij + "i) is greater than f (yik + "i) ; and the second e¤ect
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goes in the same direction as the rst. If the density is increasing, the e¤ects go in opposite
directions. However, the assumption that F is log-concave ensures that the density is not
increasing too rapidly, and thus the rst e¤ect dominates.
In any pure strategy equilibrium, the following rst order condition for optimal sabo-
tage must hold for all i and all j 6= i :
@pi
@sij
w   @ci
@sij
 0; sij  0; sij

@pi
@sij
w   @ci
@sij

= 0:
Using Lemma 1, one can show from this rst order condition that, in equilibrium, a
contestant will sabotage a rival with a higher expected output more strongly.
Proposition 1 In any equilibrium, if E (qj) > E (qk) ; then sij  sik (with strict inequal-
ity unless sij = sik = 0) for all i 6= j; k:
Proof. See appendix A.1.
The intuition for this result is from Lemma 1: if j has a higher expected output than
k; and hence a higher chance of winning, then for all the other contestants i 6= j; k the
incentives to sabotage j are higher.
It is interesting to compare Proposition 1 with the model of Chen (2003), where the
contestant with the highest expected output is not necessarily sabotaged most (see Chen
2003, p. 132). The di¤erence between the ndings is due to the di¤erent assumptions
on how sabotage diminishes the output of the victim: in the present paper, output is
additively separable in sabotage (see equation (2)), which is not the case in Chen (2003).
Proposition 1 has interesting implications for the question of whether the more able
contestants have greater chances of winning in equilibrium. Consider only the decisions of
contestants j and k and assume that (disregarding the decisions of the other contestants)
contestant j has a higher expected output and a hence better chance of winning. Corollary
1 below states a property of the reaction of the other contestants to such a situation: they
will destroy more of the output of j than of k:
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Corollary 1 In any equilibrium, if
 (xj)   (skj)   (xk)   (sjk) ; (6)
then X
i6=j;k
 (sij) 
X
i6=j;k
 (sik) ; (7)
but nevertheless E (qj)  E (qk) :
Proof. See appendix A.2.
Corollary 1 shows that the sabotage activities have an equalizing e¤ect on the winning
probabilities.7 If, looking only at the decisions of j and k; player j has a higher expected
output, then the other players will destroy more of the output of j than of k: However,
Corollary 1 also shows that j still has a weakly higher expected output than k - thus,
sabotage of the other players i 6= j; k does not reverse the initial inequality.
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 hold for all equilibria, even if they involve corner so-
lutions. Additional results can be gained by focussing on interior equilibria, where all
decision variables are strictly positive. Given the complexity of the problem, it is very
di¢ cult to derive general conditions for the existence of interior equilibria. Therefore,
in what follows I can do no better than to simply assume the existence of an interior
equilibrium.8 However, Section 6 below I also provide, for a simplied example, necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for an interior equilbrium.
Assuming an interior equilibrium, one can show that if (6) holds with strict inequality,
then (7) holds with strict inequality, too. However, in case of corner solutions it may
happen that neither j nor k are sabotaged at all by the remaining contestants.
7This does not mean that promotion chances are necessarily more equal in a model with sabotage
than in a model where sabotage is exogenously xed at zero. Consider the case where the productive
abilities of the players are equal, but their sabotage activities di¤er immensely.
8Most of the literature does this, e.g. Chen (2003).
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Clearly, the e¤ect described in Corollary 1 hinges on the presence of at least three
players. It is most pronounced in the following special case. Suppose that output is linear
in sabotage:
qi =  (xi) 
X
j 6=i
sji + "i: (8)
Further, suppose that the cost function depends only on the sum of the sabotage activities
- not on the distribution of this sum over ones rivals:
ci
 
xi;
X
j 6=i
sji
!
(9)
where ci : R2 ! R is an increasing and convex function. For future reference, I will call
the cost function in (9) total-sabotage-dependend.9
Proposition 2 Suppose that output is linear in sabotage as in (8) and that the cost
function is total-sabotage-dependend as in (9). In an interior equilibrium, every contestant
i = 1; :::; n wins with the same probability pi = 1=n:
Proof. In an interior equilibrium i sabotages all his rivals. If pj > pk, it follows from
Lemma 1 and  0 (sij) = 1 that
@pi
@sij
> @pi
@sik
: Now i can decrease sik by a small amount
and, at the same time, increase sij by the same amount. By (9), his cost is unchanged,
but his probability of winning is higher than before, so the initial situation cannot have
been an equilibrium. Therefore, we must have pj = pk for all j; k 6= i in an equilibrium
where i sabotages all his rivals. If all contestants sabotage all their rivals, it follows that
p1 = ::: = pn = 1=n:
Proposition 2 says that, in an interior equilibrium, who will win the tournament is
a matter of pure chance.10 Those contestants who produce more are sabotaged more
9See Auriol et al. (2002) for a discussion about di¤erent specications of the cost function in a related
setting.
10One can make Proposition 2 a bit stronger: we do not have to restrict attention to interior equilibria
where literally all contestants sabotage all their rivals. I show in appendix A.3 that, if at least one of
13
strongly. As mentioned in the introduction, this is in line with some recent results from
psychology on mobbing. The intuition behind Proposition 2 is simple: if (say) contestant
1 had a higher probability of winning than contestant 2, then it would be better for
contestant 3 to increase s31 by a small amount and, at the same time, decrease s32 by
the same amount. By Lemma 1, this would increase his chance of getting the promotion.
And if the cost function is total-sabotage-dependend, it does not change his costs.
4 Participation
So far it was assumed that any player can have a completely di¤erent cost function. While
this shows the generality of the results, the drawback is that there is no straightforward
way to compare the abilities of di¤erent players. In order to compare the incentives to
participate in a tournament, it is helpful to have some more specic assumptions on the
cost functions. Thus, consider the following special case of a total-sabotage-dependend
cost function:
ci
 
xi; si1; :::; si(i 1); si(i+1); :::; sin

= iC (xi) + iS
 X
j 6=i
sij
!
(10)
where C and S are strictly increasing and strictly convex functions. Here, each contestant
is characterized by two parameters. A high value of i means that i has high costs of
working productive and hence is of low productive ability. Similarly, a high value of i
means that i has high costs of sabotaging and hence has a low ability to sabotage.
Suppose that output is linear in sabotage (8) and the cost functions are given by (10).
the following conditions holds in an equilibrium, then pi = 1=n for all i = 1; :::; n in this equilibrium:
1. There are at least two contestants who sabotage all their rivals.
2. Each contestant is sabotaged by at least two rivals:
3. The contestants can be renumbered so that si(i+1) > 0 for i = 1; ::; n  1 and sn1 > 0:
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Then, in an interior equilibrium the rst order conditions reduce to
wg0 (xi) = iC 0 (xi) (11)
wg
(n  1) = iS
0
 X
j 6=i
sij
!
;
where
g :=
@pi
@xi

yij=08j 6=i = (n  1)
Z 1
 1
F (")n 2 f (")2 d":
Due to the additive separability of the cost functions and the production function, xi
does not depend on i; and
P
j 6=i sij does not depend on i. As the following proposition
shows, i will be sabotaged more than j if and only if i has a higher productive ability.
Proposition 3 Assume that output is linear in sabotage as in (8) and the cost functions
are total-sabotage-dependend as in (10). In an interior equilibrium, a player who has a
higher productive ability is sabotaged more.
Proof. By Proposition 2, pi = pj = 1=n in an interior equilibrium, and hence E (qi) =
E (qj) or X
k 6=i
ski  
X
k 6=j
skj =  (xi)   (xj) : (12)
From (11),
dxi
di
=
C 0 (xi)
wg00 (xi)  iC 00 (xi) < 0: (13)
Suppose i has a higher productive ability, i. e. a lower cost parameter i < j: From
(13), we have xi > xj; together with (12) this implies that
P
k 6=i ski >
P
k 6=j skj:
Proposition 3 is closely related to Theorem 1 in Chen (2003). In fact, if all players
have the same ability in sabotage, the results are identical (see Corollary 1 in Chen 2003).
However, Proposition 3 says that a player will be sabotaged more heavily if he has a
higher absolute ability in production - independent of the abilities to sabotage - whereas
in Chen (2003), a player is subject to more total attack if he has a higher relative ability
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in production.
In an interior equilibrium, the probability of winning is independent of the individual
cost parameters. Thus, equilibrium utilities di¤er only because the contestants incur
di¤erent costs. A higher cost parameter i has two e¤ects. First, the direct e¤ect that,
for any given e¤ort, the associated costs are higher. Second, the indirect e¤ect that a
player with a higher i chooses a lower e¤ort, which ceteribus paribus leads to lower
costs. Which of the e¤ects dominates depends on the cost function and on the production
function. If the cost function C () is very convex, or the production function  () very
concave, then a change in i has only a small e¤ect on the e¤ort chosen, and thus the
rst e¤ect dominates. Proposition 4 makes this precise. Dene
 (x) :=
C 0 (x)
0 (x)
:
Proposition 4 In an interior equilibrium, utility is decreasing in productive ability if
C (xi)
C 0 (xi)
<
 (xi)
0 (xi)
; (14)
utility is decreasing in sabotage ability if the cost-of-sabotage-function S () is strictly log-
concave.
Proof. See appendix A.4.
To illustrate, consider the case where  (x) = x: Then any log-concave cost function
(for example the class of functions C (x) = x; where  is a parameter) implies that a
higher productive ability leads to lower equilibrium utility. On the other hand, if C (x) =
exp (x) ; the two e¤ects exactly o¤set each other and equilibrium utility is independent of
i: Finally, if C (x) = exp (exp (x)), equilibrium utility is increasing in i.
Propositions 3 and 4 indicate that the rm may have problems retaining the more
productive contestants, since they are victims of more sabotage and may have a lower
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equilibrium utility from participating in the tournament. Of course, the principal can
always induce participation by all types of agents by o¤ering a xed payment for par-
ticipation. In that case, the contestants of lower ability would have a rent, while the
participation constraint of the higher ability contestants are binding.
5 Easy victims
Some contestants may be easier to sabotage than others. This can be due to personal
di¤erences between the contestants. People di¤er in their ability to cope with a hostile
environment. Or it may be due to di¤erent positions or experience within the rm.
For example, workers who are relatively new depend more strongly on the help of other
workers, if only to get information about the job and the rm. They are therefore more
vulnerable to sabotage.
To capture this is in the model, I will for simplicity return to a specication where
output is linear in the sabotage activities, with the additional twist that some contestants
are easier to sabotage than others:
qi =  (xi)  bi
X
j 6=i
sji + "i (15)
where a high value of bi means that i is an easy victim.
Proposition 5 Suppose production functions are given by (15) and the cost functions are
total-sabotage-dependent as in (9). In an interior equilibrium, contestant j has a higher
chance of winning than contestant k if and only if bj < bk:
Proof. See appendix A.5.
Proposition 5 says that contestants who are easy to sabotage will have lower chances
of winning in an interior equilibrium. The tournament will select only on the basis of the
ability to cope with sabotage. If b1 < b2 < ::: < bn, then p1 > ::: > pn: This may or may
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not be in the interest of the rm. In particular, there is no reason to assume that low
vulnerability to sabotage on the one hand, and ability to work productively on the other,
always go together.
By Proposition 5, if two contestants behave equally in an equilibrium, the one who is
an easier victim will be sabotaged more heavily. As mentioned in the introduction, this
ts with some results from the psychological literature on mobbing or bullying. Basically,
within the model, there are two reasons why a contestant might become a victim: being
an overachiever and therefore a dangerous rival, and being an easy victim.
6 Existence of interior equilibria: an example
Existence of interior equilibria chances is not automatically ensured. There can be two
types of corner solutions. First, there might be no sabotage at all in equilibrium. This
is especially likely when the marginal cost of the rst unit of sabotage is high, and if
the number of contestants is high (see Konrad (2000)). The reason is that sabotage
involves a positive externality to all the contestants except the one who is sabotaged.
This externality is more important when there are many contestants, and sabotage is
therefore less attractive.
However, even if there is some sabotage in equilibrium, there can still be corner so-
lutions of a second type. For example, if there is one contestant (she) who is much
better than all her rivals, she will have a higher chance of winning in the equilibrium
even though only she is sabotaged by all the other contestants. In such a situation, it
doesnt pay for the other contestants to sabotage anyone except her, so they direct all
sabotage against her. Intuitively, one would expect corner solutions of this type if the
contestants are very di¤erent. Given the complexity of the problem, it is very di¢ cult to
derive general conditions for existence of interior equilibria.11 However, some important
11Thus, Chen (2003) assumes existence of interior equilibria.
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lessons can be learned by considering the following example.
Example 1 Output is linear in sabotage and productive e¤ort
qi = xi  
X
j 6=i
sji + "i:
The cost functions are given by
ci
 
xi;
X
k 6=i
sik
!
=
i
2
0@x2i +
 X
k 6=i
sik
!21A :
There are two types of contestants: l low cost contestants with i = 1; and h = n  l high
cost contestants with i =  > 1:
In this example, the contestants di¤er only in one parameter. This parameter  is
a natural way to measure how di¤erent the contestants are. Higher values of  imply
greater di¤erences between contestants. Further, there will always be some sabotage in
equilibrium, since a contestant who does not sabotage at all would have zero marginal
cost of sabotaging.
Proposition 6 Consider example 1.
a) A necessary condition for the existence of an interior equilibrium is
 
8><>: 1 +
n
l(n 2) ; if l  2;
1 + n(n 2)
n2 2n+2 ; if l = 1:
(16)
b) If, in addition, the inequality
max
z

@2
@z2
Z 1
 1
F (z + ")n 1 f (") d"

<
(n  1)2
n2   2n+ 2
1
w
(17)
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holds, then existence of interior equilibria is ensured.
Proof. See appendix A.6.
Inequality (17) serves to rule out problems related to possible non - concavities of the
objective function.12 To give an example, if the error terms follow a Gumbel distribution,
it can be shown that inequality (17) holds if the variance of the error terms is high enough.
While Proposition 6 conrms the intuition that there will not be an interior equilibrium
if the contestants are very di¤erent, it also shows that contestants can di¤er substantially
and nevertheless have the same chance of winning in equilibrium. For example, if there
are two low cost contestants and one high cost contestant, then interior equilibria exist if
  5=2: The high cost contestant can have a cost function which is more than twice those
of the low cost contestants, and still have the same chance of winning in the equilibrium!
Proposition 6 implies that, if the number of contestants is large, corner solutions are
more likely. This is as should be expected. With many contestants sabotage is less
attractive, and it therefore plays a less important role. So the range of the parameter 
for which sabotage completely equalizes promotion chances gets smaller.
Proposition 6 also shows that the case of a single low cost contestant (l = 1) is di¤erent
from the other cases (l  2). The reason for this is as follows. If l  2; and the contestants
are very di¤erent, then there will be a corner solution where no one will sabotage a high
cost contestant. On the other hand, if l = 1, the single low cost contestant will always
sabotage high cost contestants, because he has no other rivals. Here, in a corner solutions
all the high cost contestants sabotage only the single low cost contestant.
The equilibrium is not unique. In fact, there is a continuum of interior equilibria, where
only the total amount of sabotage that contestant i = 1; :::; n chooses (
P
j 6=i sij); and the
12This problem is common in tournament models. See, among others, Lazear and Rosen (1981), p.
845 fn. 2; Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983), p. 29; Lazear (1989), p. 565 fn. 3; Kräkel (2000), p. 398 fn. 17;
McLaughlin (1988), p. 236 and p. 241.
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total amount of sabotage that contestant i su¤ers (
P
j 6=i sji) is determined. This can be
illustrated as follows. Suppose that every contestant i = 1; :::; n  1 sabotages contestant
i+1 one unit more, and contestant n sabotages 1 more. In addition, i = 2; :::; n sabotages
i   1 one unit less and contestant 1 sabotages contestant n less. Then the total amount
of sabotage against any contestant is unchanged, and so are all the marginal benets of
working and sabotaging. Further, the total amount of sabotage chosen by a contestant
is the same as before, and so are the marginal costs. Therefore, if the previous situation
was an equilibrium, then the new situation is an equilibrium, too. Basically, the game is
a coordination game where there are many ways to coordinate.
7 Conclusion
This paper studied sabotage in selection tournaments with heterogeneous contestants.
Sabotage can lead to equalization of promotion chances, even if the contestants di¤er a lot
in their abilities. Furthermore, it may happen that only the least productive individuals
participate. Therefore, using a tournament for selection can result in selecting (with
probability one) someone who is among the least productive.
One might think that a sequential elimination tournament as studied in Rosen (1986)
solves the problem that sabotage equalizes promotion chances. In such a tournament,
contestants are paired in each round. One winner emerges from each pair and moves on
to the next round. So in any given round, each contestant has only one rival, and it
might be thought that the equalizing e¤ect of sabotage is not at work in such a sequential
elimination tournament. But contestants do not only care about moving on to the next
round, they are also interested in meeting weak rivals in the coming rounds. This gives
them an incentive to interfere with the other paired contests in any given round. Consider,
for example, the incentives of the semi-nalists. By helping the weaker contestant in the
semi-nal contest in which one is not directly involved, and by sabotaging the stronger
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one, one increases the probability of meeting a weaker rival in the nal round. Therefore,
there is some equalizing e¤ect of sabotage at work in a sequential elimination tournament,
too.
Lazear (1989, p. 557) has argued that contestants can be separated with the right
design of promotion tracks and sabotage can thus be made more di¢ cult and hence less
important. Lazears point is that separating contestants is good for the rm because
sabotage decreases the valuable output of the contestants. The results of this paper show
that, in addition, separating contestants also helps to make better promotion decisions.
People who do not work with each other closely and regularly are less likely to know each
other well, and so they cannot direct sabotage against their strongest rivals. Therefore,
the e¤ect that sabotage equalizes promotion chances does not apply.
The results are relevant for other types of contest as well. For example, in rent seeking
contests, yardstick competition between regulated rms, or political election contests,
sabotage can equalize the probabilities of winning the contest. In rent-seeking contests, the
heterogeneity between contestants often takes the form of di¤erent valuations of winning
the contest. Applied to this setting, the results of the paper imply that there is no
guarantee that the contestants with the highest valuations will win most often.
A related problem of tournaments in the presence of sabotage is that sabotage re-
duces the incentives for productivity-enhancing investments in human capital. Since the
contestants know that the better they are, the more they will be sabotaged, they have
little incentive to invest in their human capital. This adds to the potential severity of the
problems described.
Further research should investigate the case of multiple prizes. In addition, it would
be interesting to extend the analysis to dynamic tournaments and to tournaments with
multiple rounds.
22
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof uses the following Lemmas 2 and 3 which state properties of functions that
satisfy a symmetry property like the cost functions.
Lemma 2 Let h : R2 ! R be a convex function of two variables and suppose that
h (x; y) = h (y; x) for all x and y: Then y  x implies h2 (x; y)  h1 (x; y) ; where hi
denotes the partial derivative with respect to the i  th argument.
Proof. A convex function is underestimated by a linear approximation, hence
h (y; x)  h (x; y) + h1 (x; y) (y   x) + h2 (x; y) (x  y) :
Since h (x; y) = h (y; x), we have
0  (h1 (x; y)  h2 (x; y)) (y   x)
If y > x, it follows that h2 (x; y)  h1 (x; y) :
Now consider the case y = x: Since h (x; y) = h (y; x) for all x and y; we have h1 (x; x) =
h2 (x; x) : Thus y = x implies h1 (x; y) = h2 (x; y) :
Using Lemma 2, the following fact about the cost functions is established.
Lemma 3 If
1
 0 (sij)
@ci
@sij
>
1
 0 (sik)
@ci
@sik
;
then sij > sik:
Proof. Suppose that sik  sij: Since the cost function is convex and symmetric in the
sabotage activities, Lemma 2 implies that @ci
@sik
 @ci
@sij
: Since  is concave, we also have
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 0 (sik)   0 (sij) : This shows that
sik  sij =) 1
 0 (sik)
@ci
@sik
 1
 0 (sij)
@ci
@sij
:
Equivalently,
1
 0 (sij)
@ci
@sij
>
1
 0 (sik)
@ci
@sik
=) sij > sik:
Lemma 3 says that, if i sabotages k more than i sabotages j; then is cost of destroying
an additional unit of k s output are higher than is cost of destroying an additional unit
of j s output.
Proof of Proposition 1. E (qj) > E (qk) implies pj > pk: Thus, by Lemma 1,
1
 0 (sij)
@pi
@sij
>
1
 0 (sik)
@pi
@sik
8i 6= j; k: (18)
Next I argue that inequality (18) implies sij  sik: This follows directly from the non-
negativity constraints if sik = 0: Thus, suppose sik > 0: Then the following rst order
condition has to hold:
@pi
@sik
w =
@ci
@sik
; (19)
@pi
@sij
w  @ci
@sij
: (20)
Using (20), (18), and (19) (in that order),
1
 0 (sij)
@ci
@sij
 1
 0 (sij)
@pi
@sij
w >
1
 0 (sik)
@pi
@sik
w =
1
 0 (sik)
@ci
@sik
:
By Lemma 3, this implies that sij > sik:
24
A.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Line (7) is derived by contradiction. Suppose that (6) holds but
P
i6=j;k  (sij) <
P
i6=j;k  (sik) :
Then E (qj) > E (qk) : By Proposition 1, this implies sij  sik for all i 6= j; k: Using the
fact that  is increasing, and summing over i; gives
P
i6=j;k  (sij) 
P
i6=j;k  (sik) ; con-
tradiction.
It remains to show that E (qj)  E (qk) : To see this, suppose to the contrary that
E (qj) < E (qk) : By Proposition 1, it follows that sij  sik for all i 6= j; k; henceP
i6=j;k  (sij) 
P
i6=j;k  (sik) : Together with inequality (7), this implies
P
i6=j;k  (sij) =P
i6=j;k  (sik) : By (6), we have E (qj)  E (qk) ; contradiction.
A.3 Proof of stronger version of Proposition 2
1) If there are two contestants i; j who sabotage all their rivals, then it follows that for
all k 6= i; j: pk = pi (since j sabotages both k and i) and pk = pj (since i sabotages both
k and j). Therefore we have pk = pi = pj = 1=n:
2) Suppose in an equilibrium every contestant is sabotaged by two rivals. That is, we
have 8i9ji; ki : i 6= ji 6= ki 6= i; s(ji)i > 0 and s(ki)i > 0: Then pi  pl for all l 6= ji since i
is sabotaged by ji: Also, since i is sabotaged by ki; we have pi  pl for all l 6= ki: Putting
things together, pi  pl for all l 6= i: Since this holds for all i; we have pi = 1=n for all
i = 1; :::; n:
3) If, in an equilibrium, we have s(k 1)k > 0; then it follows that pk  pk+1; since
k  1 sabotages k: Therefore, if the contestants can be renumbered so that si(i+1) > 0 for
i = 1; ::; n   1 and sn1 > 0; we have p2  p3  :::  pn  p1  p2 or pi = 1=n for all
i = 1; :::; n.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Clearly, 0 (x) > 0 and hence an inverse function  1 exists and is increasing. From the
rst order condition (11), xi =  1 (wg=i) : Thus, in equilibrium i s cost of working
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productively is iC ( 1 (wg=i)) : Di¤erentiating,
@
@i

iC

 1

wg
i

=
= C

 1

wg
i

  iC 0

 1

wg
i

1
0

 1

wg
i
wg
2i
=
= C (xi)  C 0 (xi)  (xi)
0 (xi)
:
If (14) holds, equilibrium costs are decreasing in i: Thus, higher ability (lower i) leads
to higher costs and thus lower utility.
Similarly, i s cost of sabotage is iS (S
0 1 (wg= (i (n  1)))) : Di¤erentiating,
@
@i

iS

S 0 1

wg
i (n  1)

=
= S
 X
j 6=i
sij
!
  iS 0
 X
j 6=i
sij
!
1
S 00
P
j 6=i sij
 wg
2i (n  1)
=
= S
 X
j 6=i
sij
!
 

S 0
P
j 6=i sij
2
S 00
P
j 6=i sij
 :
This is strictly negative if S () is strictly log-concave:
d2
dt2
(lnS (t))  S (t)S
00 (t)  (S 0 (t))2
(S (t))2
< 0:
Thus, a higher ability to sabotage (lower i) leads to higher costs and hence lower utility.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
In an interior equilibrium it must be true that @pi
@sij
w = @ci
@sij
and @pi
@sik
w = @ci
@sik
: By (9),
@ci
@sij
= @ci
@sik
; hence @pi
@sij
= @pi
@sik
or
bj
Z 1
 1
f (yij + ") [l 6=i;jF (yil + ")] f (") d" = bk
Z 1
 1
f (yik + ") [l 6=i;kF (yil + ")] f (") d":
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If bj < bk this implies
Z 1
 1
f (yij + ") [l 6=i;jF (yil + ")] f (") d" >
Z 1
 1
f (yik + ") [l 6=i;kF (yil + ")] f (") d"
which, by the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 1, implies pj > pk: Conversely, if
bj  bk; we get pj  pk::
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
A.6.1 Part a)
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is an interior equilibrium. By Proposition
2, pi = 1=n for all i = 1; :::; n: Hence yij = 0 for all i and j 6= i: Denote the set of all low
cost contestants by L; and the set of all high cost contestants by H: The following rst
order conditions have to hold in the supposed equilibrium:
xi = wg for all i 2 L; (21)
xi =
wg

for all i 2 H; (22)X
k 6=i
sik =
wg
n  1 for all i 2 L; (23)X
k 6=i
sik =
wg
(n  1)  for all i 2 H: (24)
Further, from pi = pj = 1=n we get
xi  
X
k 6=i
ski = xj  
X
k 6=j
skj for all i and j: (25)
Equations (21) and (25) imply that
P
k 6=i ski =
P
k 6=j skj for all i; j 2 L: That is, all low
cost types endure the same amount of sabotage. Call this amount Sl :
X
k 6=i
ski =
X
k 6=j
skj =: Sl for all i; j 2 L: (26)
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In the same way it follows from equations (22) and (25) that all high cost types endure
the same amount of sabotage:
X
k 6=i
ski =
X
k 6=j
skj =: Sh for i; j 2 H: (27)
Now let us calculate Sl and Sh: Summing over equations (23) and (24) we nd that
the total amount of sabotage equals
nX
i=1
X
j 6=i
sji = l
wg
n  1 + h
wg
 (n  1) = lSl + hSh; (28)
where the second equality follows from equations (26) and (27). From equations (21) to
(27) we get
wg   Sl = wg

  Sh: (29)
Combining equations (28) and (29) and using l + h = n; we nally get
Sh = wg
n  l (n  2) (   1)
n (n  1) ; (30)
Sl = wg
n+ (   1) (l + h (n  1))
n (n  1) : (31)
If  > 1 + n
l(n 2) ; equation (30) implies Sh < 0; a contradiction. This completes the
proof for the case l > 1:
If there is only one low cost contestant (l = 1), this contestant directs all his sabotage
against high cost contestant. We can calculate the total amount of sabotage that high
cost contestants inict on high cost contestants as the di¤erence between the total amount
of sabotage su¤ered by high cost contestants, hSh; and the amount of sabotage chosen by
the low cost contestant, wg= (n  1) :
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X
i2H
X
j2H;j 6=i
sij = hSh   wg
n  1 = wg
n (n  2)  (   1) (n2   2n+ 2)
n (n  1) (32)
This is non-negative if and only if   1 + n(n 2)
n2 2n+2 : This completes the proof.
A.6.2 Part b)
This section develops the su¢ cient condition for existence of interior equilibria in example
1. Existence is proved by direct construction of such equilibria. I focus on symmetric
equilibria, in which
sik =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
sll
slh
shl
shh
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
; if i 2
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
L
L
H
H
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
and j 2
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
L
H
L
H
9>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>;
:
Let us rst derive candidates for symmetric interior equilibria, and check afterwards that
they are really equilibria. In an interior equilibrium, the e¤ort choices xi have to be given
by equations (21) and (22). Further, a contestant i 2 H sabotages l low cost contestants
and h   1 high cost contestants. The total amount of sabotage that a contestant i 2 H
chooses in a symmetric equilibrium is therefore
X
j
sij = lshl + (h  1) shh = wg
 (n  1) for all i 2 H: (33)
The second equality follows from equation (24). Similarly
X
j
sij = (l   1) sll + hslh = wg
(n  1) for all i 2 L: (34)
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The total amount of sabotage su¤ered by contestant i is
X
j
sji = lslh + (h  1) shh = Sh if i 2 H; (35)X
j
sji = (l   1) sll + hshl = Sl if i 2 L; (36)
where Sh and Sl are given by equations (30) and (31). Equations (33) to (36) are four
equations in the four unknowns sll; slh; shl and sll: However, if l  2 and h  2 (the
remaining cases will be considered later), equations (33) to (36) are linearly dependent.
Using slh as a free variable, equations (33) to (36) can be solved to get
sll =
wg
(n  1) (l   1)  
n  l
(l   1)slh; (37)
shh = wg
n  (   1) l (n  2)
n (n  1) (n  l   1)  
lslh
(n  l   1) ; (38)
shl =
(n  2) (   1)wg
(n  1) n + slh: (39)
If the condition (16) given in Proposition 6 a) is satised, and
slh 2

0;min

wg
(n  1) (n  l) ; wg
n  (   1) l (n  2)
n (n  1) l

; (40)
then all the variables given in equations (37) to (40) are non-negative. Moreover, note
that condition (16) implies that (   1) l (n  2)  n, and thus the interval in line (40) is
not empty.
In what follows, I show that, if the conditions given in Proposition 6 are satised, then
there exists a continuum of interior equilibria given by (21), (22), and (37) to (40).
Consider the maximization problem of contestant i; given that the other contestants
behave according to one of these candidate equilibria. Contestant i chooses
 
xi; si1; :::; si(i 1); si(i+1); :::; sin

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to maximize ui; subject to the non-negativity constraints xi  0 and sij  0 for all j 6= i.
As a rst step, I will ignore for the moment the constraints and solve the unconstrained
problem. We will check afterwards that the constraints are satised.
The unconstrained problem certainly has a solution. This can be seen as follows. It
is never optimal to choose very high values of the decision variables. Therefore we can
consider the problem
maximize ui s.t.   k  xi  k and   k  sij  k for all j 6= i (41)
for some su¢ ciently high k 2 R: By the Weierstrass theorem, a solution to problem (41)
exists. If k is high enough, the solution to problem (41) also solves the unconstrained
problem.
The following lemma allows the n-dimensional optimization problem to be reduced to
a one-dimensional one:
Lemma 4 Let l  2 and h  2: Suppose all contestants except i behave symmetrically
according to equations (21), (22), and (37) to (40). In the optimum of the unconstrained
optimization problem of contestant i; the following conditions have to hold.
a) Contestant i sabotages all his low cost rivals equally:
sij = sik =: sil for all j; k 2 L; j; k 6= i;
and i also sabotages all his high cost rivals equally:
sij = sik =: sih for all j; k 2 H; j; k 6= i:
b) Contestant i sabotages his high cost and his low cost rivals so that they have the same
chance of winning:
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wg   (l   2) sll   hshl   sil = wg   (l   1) slh   (h  1) shh   sih; if i 2 L; and
wg   (l   1) sll   (h  1) shl   sil = wg   lslh   (h  2) shh   sih; if i 2 H.
c) All rivals of i have the same chance of winning: yij = yik for all j; k:
d)
xi =
8><>: (n  1) ((l   1) sil + hsih) ; if i 2 L;(n  1) (lsil + (h  1) sih) ; if i 2 H:
Proof. a) Suppose there are j; k 2 L (j; k 6= i) such that sij > sik: Since j and k are
treated in the same way by all other contestants, and choose the same xj = xk = wg; this
implies yij > yik. Now contestant i could decrease sij a little and increase sik by the same
amount. By Lemma 1, this increases pi, while the costs of contestant i are unchanged.
Therefore, it cannot be optimal to choose sij > sik:
The case j; k 2 H and part b) are proved in the same way as a). Part c) is obvious
from a) and b).
d) It follows from equation (3) that, in Example 1,
P
j 6=i
@pi
@sij
= @pi
@xi
: Using c) we have
@pi
@sij
= @pi
@sik
for all j; k 6= i and hence
(n  1) @pi
@sij
=
@pi
@xi
:
In the optimum of the unconstrained problem, the rst order conditions w @pi
@xi
= ixi
and w @pi
@sij
= i
P
j 6=i sij have to hold with equality. Putting things together, xi =
(n  1)Pj 6=i sij: Finally, using a) completes the proof.
Lemma 4 establishes that, in the optimum of the unconstrained problem, certain
relations between si1; :::; sin and xi must hold. It allows us to express the unconstrained
problem as a one-dimensional problem, where the contestant i maximizes only over xi.
Denote the objective function in this reduced problem by u^i (xi) :
Take the case i 2 L. Straightforward but tedious omitted calculations show that
u^i (xi) =
Z 1
 1
F ( (xi   wg) + ")n 1 f (") d"w   1
2
x2i ; (42)
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where  := 1 + 1
(n 1)2 :
Lemma 5 If inequality (17) holds, u^i (xi) given in (42) is strictly concave.
Proof. The objective function u^i (xi) is strictly concave for all xi if
max
xi

@2
@x2i
Z 1
 1
F ( (xi   wg) + ")n 1 f (") d"w

< : (43)
Note that
@2
@x2i
Z 1
 1
F ( (xi   wg) + ")n 1 f (") d" =
= 2

@2
@z2
Z 1
 1
F (z + ")n 1 f (") d"

z=(xi wg)
:
Therefore, inequality (43) is equivalent to
max
z

@2
@z2
Z 1
 1
F (z + ")n 1 f (") d"

<
w

=
(n  1)2
n2   2n+ 2w
which is inequality (17).
By Lemma 5, the solution to maxxi u^i (xi) can be found simply as the solution of the
rst order condition du^i(xi)
dxi
= 0; which is, of course, unique and as given by equation (21):
xi = wg:
By using Lemma 4, we can verify that sij = sll for all j 2 L (where sll is given in (37)),
and sij = slh for all j 2 H; solve the unconstrained maximization problem of contestant
i: Again, these calculations are straightforward but tedious and hence omitted.
Finally, we have to check whether all decision variables satisfy the non-negativity
constraints. This is guaranteed by the condition   1+ n
l(n 2) : Therefore, we have shown
that no i 2 L has an incentive to deviate from any of the symmetric candidate equilibria.
In the same way, it can be shown that no i 2 H has an incentive to deviate. For an
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i 2 H; the objective function of the reduced problem turns out to be
u^i (xi) =
Z 1
 1
F



xi   wg


+ "
n 1
f (") d"w   1
2
x2i :
The condition ensuring concavity is
max
z

@2
@z2
Z 1
 1
F (z + ")n 1 f (") d"

<

w
: (44)
The only di¤erence from inequality (17) is the  on the right hand side. Since  > 1, if
(17) holds, so does (44). This completes the proof of Proposition 6 b) for the case that
l  2 and h  2:
The two remaining cases where there is only one low cost contestant, or only one high
cost contestant, can be dealt with similarly. In these cases there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium. If l = 1;
slh =
wg
(n  1)2 ;
shl = wg
(2 + n (n  2)) (   1) + n
n (n  1)2 ;
shh = wg
n (n  2)  (   1) (n2   2n+ 2)
n (n  1)
1
h (h  1) :
Of course, shh is non-negative if, and only if, the inequality given in Proposition 6a for the
case l = 1 holds. Also note that, as it must be the case, h (h  1) shh =
P
i2H
P
j2H;j 6=i sij
where the right hand side is given in equation (32) above.
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Finally, if h = 1;
shl =
wg
 (n  1)2 ;
sll = wg
(2   1) (n  1)2   1
n (n  1)2 (n  2) ;
slh = wg
n  (   1) (n  1) (n  2)
n (n  1) (n  1) :
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